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Hook: Constitutional Law--Regulation of the Milk Industry Through Price
CASE COMMENTS

Constitutional Law - Regulation of the Milk Industry
Through Price Control
Action by the State Dairy Commission to enjoin D, a retail
grocer, from selling milk at a price below the minimum fixed by
the Commission, acting pursuant to authority under a state statute.
D demurred to the complaint on the ground that the price fixing
provisions of the act were unconstitutional in that they violated
due process of law as guaranteed by the state constitution. Held,
affirmed by a three to two decision. Control of business by fixing
prices is justifiable under the police power only when the industry
is "affected with a public interest." Certain characteristics of milk
require regulation for the protection of the public health, but do
not render the -industry so "affected with a public interest" that
the state may subject it to price control. Gwynette v. Myers, 115
S.E.2d 673 (S. C. 1960).
The court bases its decision on the rule stated in Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). In the Munn case the Court held
that a state statute fixing the price which could be charged for
the storage of grain at commercial elevators did not violate due
process as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution. The property was held to be "affected with
a public interest" in that it was devoted to a use in which the public
had an interest and was therefore subject to price control for the
public good. However, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934),
modified the rule established in the Munn case, supra. Here the
Court held that the phrase "affected with a public interest" meant
no more than that a business "for adequate reasons, is subject to
control for the public good."
A state statute authorizing the fixing of milk prices was held
not to violate due process in the Nebbia case, supra; an opposite
result was reached in the case under comment. These conflicting
results were not due to a substantial difference between federal and
state due process but because the South Carolina court followed
the Munn case rather than the broadened concept of permissive
regulation under state police power set forth in the Nebbia decision.
While courts are still employing this earlier concept in determining
to what extent business may be regulated under the police power,
it "has lost the greater part, if not all, of its mystical power." ROTTSCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 487 (1939).

Hence, the de-

cision in the Nebbia case has been followed by many of the courts
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wherein the constitutionality of statutes fixing milk prices has been
challenged. Shiver v. Lee, 89 So.2d 318, 321-22 (Fla. 1956). The
question might be asked: Why is it generally held that such statutes
do not violate due process?
The decision in the Nebbia case makes the "test of liability
of any business to governmental price control depend on whether
it could be justified by principles applicable in determining the
validity of any other form of exercise of a state's police power."
ROTTSCHAEFER, supra at 486-87. The Court stated in the Nebbia
case that any business may be controlled to the extent of fixing
prices where the purpose of the legislature is to promote the general welfare and the manner in which it seeks to effectuate such
purpose is reasonable. Such legislation will not be deemed unconstitutional so long as it is not arbitrary or discriminatory or
an unwarranted -interference with individual liberty.
In a case decided shortly after the Nebbia decision, the Virginia court, in sustaining the validity of a statute fixing milk prices,
stated that the legislature was better equipped to determine the
necessity and character of regulating an industry which new and
perplexing conditions might require, and that the conclusion of the
legislature should not be disturbed unless it was arbitrary or unreasonable. Reynolds v. Milk Comm'n., 163 Va. 957, 967, 179 S.E.
507, 510 (1935). Another case decided in the same decade, Rohrer
v. Milk Control Bd., 322 Pa. 257, 186 Ad. 336 (1936), held a
milk price fixing statute valid. Here the court stated that the
statute was enacted for a valid legislative purpose, that is, the promotion of public welfare by insuring the availability of an adequate
supply of pure milk. Two more recent cases have also upheld
statutes allowing milk prices to be controlled. Shiver v. Lee, supra;
Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts. v. McCrory, 237 La. 768,
112 So.2d 606 (1959). In the Shiver case the court stated that
the police power was invoked for the "protection of the public
health, safety and welfare." The court stated further that the power
to fix prices is not dependent upon the existence of an economic
emergency, but that such power may be exercised because of the
"peculiar nature of the problem incident to marketing the commodity."
However, in addition to the principal case, there is other authority contra to the holding in the Nebbia case. In Harrisv. Duncan, 208 Ga. 561, 67 S.E.2d 692 (1951), the court held that price
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fixing in the milk industry violates the right of the individual's freedom of contract which is protected by both the federal and state
constitutions. The court, in overruling prior decisions sustaining
the validity of the price fixing statute, held that the legislature can
only fix prices where business is "affected with a public interest."
The milk industry, according to the court, is not so affected.
Both the Georgia case and the case under comment represent
the minority view. For the most part the courts seem inclined to
follow the Nebbia case, which is the law today at least so far as
an interpretation of federal due process is concerned. Mr. Justice
McReynolds, speaking for the minority in the Nebbia case, expressed the fear that by allowing the fixing of milk prices, price
control would extend to other goods. Nebbia v. New York, supra
at 551. However, since that decision over twenty-five years ago,
there have been relatively few extensions of price fixing to other
goods and services. That courts are going to be cautious in extending the doctrine is shown by two fairly recent cases. In State
Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 40 Cal.2d 436, 254
P.2d 29 (1953), the court held unconstitutional a statute authorizing
the fixing of minimum prices for dry cleaning. In Edwards v. State
Bd. of Barber Examiners, 72 Ariz. 108, 231 ,P.2d 450 (1951),
a state law fixing minimum prices for barbering services was declared -invalid. These statutes were held to be beyond the scope
of the police power as their purpose was not primarily the promotion of public welfare.
Nevertheless, the fixing of prices is not in itself unconstitutional.
The test, as stated previously, is whether a statute allowing price
control, has as its purpose a legitimate end, and seeks to attain
such end in a reasonable manner. If it meets these requirements
it should not be violative of due process.
Peter Uriah Hook

Contracts - Conditions - Restraint of Remarriage
P's brothers entered into a contract with D in which D promised
to pay royalties (on the sale of corn husking machines) to P's
mother during her life and upon her death to pay like royalties to
P "provided she shall not have theretofore remarried; such royalties to be paid to her until her death or remarriage." P remarried
in 1944 and her mother died in 1945. P alleges that the condition
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